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Abstract
Answer set programming (ASP) is a logic programming paradigm that
can be used to solve complex combinatorial search problems. Aggregates are
an ASP construct that plays an important role in many applications. Defining
a satisfactory semantics of aggregates turned out to be a difficult problem,
and in this paper we propose a new approach, based on an analogy between
aggregates and propositional connectives. First, we extend the definition of
an answer set/stable model to cover arbitrary propositional theories; then we
define aggregates on top of them both as primitive constructs and as abbrevi-
ations for formulas. Our definition of an aggregate combines expressiveness
and simplicity, and it inherits many theorems about programs with nested
expressions, such as theorems about strong equivalence and splitting.
1 Introduction
Answer set programming (ASP) is a logic programming paradigm that can be used
to solve complex combinatorial search problems ([Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1999]), ([Niemela¨, 1999]).
ASP is based on the stable model semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] for logic
programs: programming in ASP consists in writing a logic program whose sta-
ble models (also called answer sets) represent the solution to our problem. ASP
has been used, for instance, in planning [Dimopoulos et al., 1997; Lifschitz, 1999],
model checking [Liu et al., 1998; Heljanko and Niemela¨, 2001], product configu-
ration [Soininen and Niemela¨, 1998], logical cryptanalysis [Hietalahti et al., 2000],
workflow specification [Trajcevski et al., 2000; Koksal et al., 2001], reasoning about
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policies [Son and Lobo, 2001], wire routing problems [Erdem et al., 2000] and phy-
logeny reconstruction problems [Erdem et al., 2003].
The stable models of a logic program are found by systems called answer set
solvers. Answer set solvers can be considered the equivalent of SAT solvers —
systems used to find the models of propositional formulas — in logic programming.
On the other hand, it is much easier to express, in logic programming, recursive
definitions (such as reachability in a graph) and defaults. Several answer set solvers
have been developed so far, with SMODELS1 and DLV2 among the most popular.
As in the case of SAT solvers, answer set solver competitions — where answer set
solvers are compared to each others in terms of performance — are planned to be
held regularly.3
An important construct in ASP are aggregates. Aggregates allow, for instance,
to perform set operations such as counting the number of atoms in a set that are true,
or summing weights the weights of the atoms that are true. We can, for instance,
express that a node in a graph has exactly one color by the following cardinality
constraint:
1 ≤ {c(node, color1), . . . , c(node, colorm)} ≤ 1.
As another example, a weight constraint of the form
3 ≤ {p = 1, q = 2, r = 3} (1)
intuitively says that the sum of the weights (the numbers after the “=” sign) of the
atoms from the list p, q, r that are true is at least 3.
Aggregates are a hot topic in ASP not only because of their importance, but also
because there is no standard understanding of the concept of an aggregate. In fact,
different answer set solvers implement different definitions of aggregates: for in-
stance, SMODELS implements cardinality and weight constraints [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000],
while DLV implements aggregates as defined by Faber, Leone and Pfeifer (2005)
(we call them FLP-aggregates). Unfortunately, constructs that are intuitively equiv-
alent to each other may actually lead to different stable models. In some sense, no
current definition of an aggregate can be considered fully satisfactory, as each of
them seems to have properties that look unintuitive. For instance, it is somehow
puzzling that, as noticed in [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b], weight constraints
0 ≤ {p = 2, p = −1} and 0 ≤ {p = 1}
are semantically different from each other (may lead to different stable models).
Part of this problem is probably related to the lack of mathematical tools for study-
1http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels/
2http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/
3http://asparagus.cs.uni-potsdam.de/contest/
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Figure 1: Evolution of the stable model semantics.
ing properties of programs with aggregates, in particular for reasoning about the
correctness of programs with aggregates.
This paper addresses the problems of aggregates mentioned above by (i) giving
a new semantics of aggregates that, we argue, is more satisfactory than the existing
alternatives, and (ii) providing tools for studying properties of logic programs with
aggregates.
Our approach is based on a relationship between two directions of research on
extending the stable model semantics: the work on aggregates, mentioned above,
and the work on “propositional extensions” (see Figure 1). The latter makes the
syntax of rules more and more similar to the syntax of propositional formulas.
In disjunctive programs, the head of each rule is a (possibly empty) disjunction
of atoms, while in programs with nested expressions the head and body of each
rule can be any arbitrary formula built with connectives AND, OR and NOT. For
instance,
¬(p ∨ ¬q)← p ∨ ¬¬r
is a rule with nested expressions. Programs with nested expressions are quite at-
tractive especially relative to point (ii) above, because many theorems about prop-
erties of logic programs have been proved for programs of this kind. For instance,
the splitting set theorem [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994; Erdog˘an and Lifschitz, 2004]
simplifies the task of computing the stable models of a program/theory by breaking
it into two parts. Work on strong equivalence [Lifschitz et al., 2001] allows us to
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Figure 2: The proposed extensions
modify a program/theory with the guarantee that stable models are preserved (more
details in Section 2.4).
Nested expressions have already been used to express aggregates: [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b]
showed that each weight constraint can be replaced by a nested expressions, pre-
serving its stable models. As a consequence, theorems about nested expressions
can be used for programs with weight constraints. It turns out, however, that nested
expressions are not sufficiently general for defining a semantics for aggregates that
overcomes the unintuitive features of the existing approaches. For this reason, we
extend the syntax of rules with nested expressions, allowing implication in every
part of a “rule”, and not only as the outermost connective. (We understand a rule
as an implication from the body to the head). A “rule” is then an arbitrary proposi-
tional formula, and a program an arbitrary propositional theory. Our new definition
of a stable model, like all the other definitions, is based on the process of construct-
ing a reduct. The process that we use looks very different from all the others, and
in particular for programs with nested expressions. Nevertheless, it turns out that
in application to programs with nested expressions, our definition is equivalent to
the one from [Lifschitz et al., 1999]. This new definition of a stable model also
turns out to closely related to equilibrium logic [Pearce, 1997], a logic based on
the concept of a Kripke-model in the logic of here-and-there. Also, we will show
that many theorems about programs with nested expressions extend to arbitrary
propositional theories.
4
On top of arbitrary propositional formulas, we give our definition of an ag-
gregate. Our extension of the semantics to aggregates treats aggregates in a way
similar to propositional connectives. Aggregates can be viewed either as primitive
constructs or as abbreviations for propositional formulas; both approaches lead to
the same concept of a stable model. The second view is important because it allows
us to use theorems about stable models of propositional formulas in the presence of
aggregates. As an example of application of such theorems, we use them to prove
the correctness of an ASP program with aggregates that encodes a combinatorial
auction problem.
Syntactically, our aggregates can occur in any part of a formula, even nested
inside each other. (The idea of “nested aggregates” is not completely new, as the
proof of Theorem 3(a) in [Ferraris, 2007] involves “nested weight constraints”.)
In our definition of an aggregate we can have, in the same program/theory, many
other kinds of constructs, such as choice rules and disjunction in the head, while
other definitions allow only a subset of them. Our aggregates seems not to exibit
the unintuitive behaviours of other definitions of aggregates.
It also turns out that a minor syntactical modification of programs with FLP-
aggregates allows us to view them as a special kind of our aggregates. (The new
picture of extensions is shown in Figure 2.) Consequently, we also have a “propo-
sitional” representation of FLP-aggregates. We use this fact to compare them with
other aggregates that have a characterization in terms of nested expressions. (As
we said, [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b] showed that weight constraints can be ex-
pressed as nested expressions, and also [Pelov et al., 2003] implicitly defined PDB-
aggregates in terms of nested expressions.) We will show that all characteriza-
tions of aggregates are essentially equivalent to each other when the aggregates are
monotone or antimonotone and without negation, while there are differences in the
other cases.4
The paper is divided into three main parts. We start, in the next section, with
the new definition of a stable model for propositional theories, their properties and
comparisons with previous definitions of stable models and equilibrium logic. In
Section 3 we present our aggregates, their properties and the comparisons with
other definitions of aggregates. Section 4 contains all proofs for the theorems of
this paper. The paper ends with the conclusions in Section 5.
Preliminary reports on some results of this paper were published in [Ferraris, 2005].
4The important role of monotonicity in aggregates has already been shown, for instance,
in [Faber et al., 2004].
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2 Stable models of propositional theories
2.1 Definition
Usually, in logic programming, variables are allowed. As in most definitions of
a stable model, we assume that the variables have been replaced by constants in
a process called “grounding” (see, for instance, [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988]), so
that we can consider the signature to be essentially propositional.
(Propositional) formulas are built from atoms and the 0-place connective ⊥
(false), using the connectives ∧, ∨ and →. Even if our definition of a stable model
below applies to formulas with all propositional connectives, we will consider ⊤
as an abbreviation for ⊥ → ⊥, a formula ¬F as an abbreviation for F → ⊥ and
F ↔ G as an abbreviation for (F → G) ∧ (G → F ). This will keep notation for
other sections simpler. It can be shown that these abbreviations perfectly capture
the meaning of⊤, ¬ and ↔ as primitive connectives in the stable model semantics.
A (propositional) theory is a set of formulas. As usual in logic programming,
truth assignments will be viewed as sets of atoms; we will write X |= F to express
that a set X of atoms satisfies a formula F , and similarly for theories.
An implication F → G can be also written as a “rule” G ← F , so that tradi-
tional programs, disjunctive programs and programs with nested expressions (re-
viewed in Section 2.2) can be seen as special cases of propositional theories.5
We will now define when a set X of atoms is a stable model of a propositional
theory Γ. For the rest of the section X denotes a set of atoms.
The reduct FX of a propositional formula F relative to X is obtained from
F by replacing each maximal subformula not satisfied by X with ⊥. That is,
recursively,
• ⊥X = ⊥;
• for every atom a, if X |= a then aX is a, otherwise it is ⊥; and
• for every formulas F and G and any binary connective ⊗, if X |= F ⊗ G
then (F ⊗G)X is FX ⊗GX , otherwise it is ⊥.
This definition of reduct is similar to a transformation proposed in [Osorio et al., 2004,
Section 4.2].
5Traditionally, conjunction is represented in a logic program by a comma, disjunction by a semi-
colon, and negation as failure as not.
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For instance, if X contains p but not q then
(p← ¬q)X = (p← (q → ⊥))X = p← (⊥ → ⊥) = p← ⊤
(q ← ¬p)X = (q ← (p→ ⊥))X = ⊥ ← ⊥
((p→ q) ∨ (q → p))X = ⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p)
(2)
The reduct ΓX of a propositional theory Γ relative to X is {FX : F ∈ Γ}. A
set X of atoms is a stable model of Γ if X is a minimal set satisfying ΓX .
For instance, let Γ be the theory consisting of
p← ¬q
q ← ¬p
(3)
Theory Γ is actually a traditional program, a logic program in the sense of [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988]
(more details in the next section). Set {p} is a stable model of Γ; indeed, by look-
ing at the first two lines of (2) we can see that Γ{p} is {p ← ⊤,⊥ ← ⊥}, which is
satisfied by {p} but not by its unique proper subset ∅. It is easy to verify that {q}
is the only other stable model of Γ. Similarly, it is not difficult to see that {p} is
the only stable model of the theory
(p→ q) ∨ (q → p)
p
(4)
(The reduct relative to {p} is {⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p), p}).
As the name suggests, a stable model of a propositional theory Γ is a model —
in the sense of classical logic — of Γ. Indeed, it follows from the easily verifiable
fact that, for each set X of atoms, X |= ΓX iff X |= Γ. On the other hand, formulas
that are equivalent in classical logic may have different stable models: for instance,
{¬¬p} has no stable models, while {p} has stable model {p}. Proposition 5 below
will give some characterizations of transformations that preserves stable models.
Notice that classically equivalent transformations can be applied to the reduct of a
theory, as the sets of atoms that are minimal don’t change.
Finally, a note about a second kind of negation in propositional theories. In
[Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005a, Section 3.9], atoms were divided into two groups:
“positive” and “negative”, so that each negative atom has the form ∼a, where a is
a positive atom. Symbol ∼ is called “strong negation”, to distinguish it from the
connective ¬, which is called negation as failure.6 In presence of strong negation,
6Strong negation was introduced in the syntax of logic programs in [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991].
In that paper, it was called “classical negation” and treated not as a part of an atom, but rather as a
logical operator.
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kind of rule syntax
traditional a← l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln
disjunctive a1 ∨ · · · ∨ am ← l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln
with nested expressions F ← G (F and G are nested expressions)
Figure 3: Syntax of “propositional” logic programs. Each a, a1, . . . , am (m ≥ 0)
denotes an atom, and each l1, . . . , ln (n ≥ 0) a literal — an atom possibly prefixed
by ¬. A nested expression is any formula that contains no implications other than
negations or ⊤.
the stable model semantics says that only sets of atoms that don’t contain both
atoms a and∼a can be stable models. For simplicity, we will make no distinctions
between positive and negative atoms, considering that we can remove the sets of
atoms containing any pair of atoms a and b from the stable models of a theory by
adding a formula ¬(a ∧ b) to the theory. (See Proposition 7).
2.2 Relationship with previous definitions of a stable model
As mentioned in the introduction, a propositional theory is the extension of tradi-
tional programs [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988], disjunctive programs [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991]
and programs with nested expressions [Lifschitz et al., 1999] (see Figure 2). We
want to compare the definition of a stable model from the previous section with the
definitions in the three papers cited above.
The syntax of a traditional rule, disjunctive rule and rule with nested expres-
sions are shown in Figure 3. We understand an empty conjunction as ⊤ and an
empty disjunction as ⊥, so that traditional and disjunctive rules are also rules with
nested expressions. The part before and after the arrow ← are called the head and
the body of the rule, respectively. When the body is empty (or ⊤), we can denote
the whole rule by its head. A logic program is a set of rules. If all rules in a
logic program are traditional then we say that the program is traditional too, and
similarly for the other two kinds of rules.
For instance, (3) is a traditional program as well as a disjunctive program and
a program with nested expressions. On the other hand, (4) is not a logic program
of any of those kinds, because of the first formula that contains implications nested
in a disjunction.
For all kinds of programs described above, the definition of a stable model
is similar to ours for propositional theories: to check whether a set X of atoms
is a stable model of a program Π, we (i) compute the reduct of Π relative to
X, and (ii) verify if X is a minimal model of such reduct. On the other hand,
the way in which the reduct is computed is different. We consider the definition
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from [Lifschitz et al., 1999], as the definitions from [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988,
1991] are essentially its special cases.
The reduct ΠX of a program Π with nested expressions relative to a set X of
atoms is the result of replacing, in each rule of Π, each maximal subformula of the
form ¬F with ⊤ if X |= ¬F , and with ⊥ otherwise. Set X is a stable model of Π
if it is a minimal model of ΠX . 7
For instance, if Π is (3) then the reduct Π{p} is
p← ⊤
q ← ⊥,
while Π∅ is
p← ⊤
q ← ⊤,
The stable models of Π — based on this definition of the reduct — are the same
ones that we computed in the previous section using the newer definition of a
reduct: {p} and {q}. On the other hand, there are differences in the value of the
reducts: for instance, we have just seen that Π∅ is classically equivalent to {p, q},
while Π∅ = {⊥,⊥}. However, some similarities between these definitions exist.
For instance, negations are treated essentially in the same way: a nested expression
¬F is transformed into ⊥ if X |= F , and into ⊤ otherwise, under both definitions
of a reduct.
The following proposition states a more general relationship between the new
definition and the 1999 definition of a reduct.
Proposition 1. For any program Π with nested expressions and any set X of atoms,
ΠX is equivalent, in the sense of classical logic,
• to ⊥, if X 6|= Π, and
• to the program obtained from ΠX by replacing all atoms that do not belong
to X by ⊥, otherwise.
Corollary 1. Given two sets of atoms X and Y with Y ⊆ X and any program Π
with nested expressions, Y |= ΠX iff X |= Π and Y |= ΠX .
From the corollary above, one of the main claims of this paper follows, that
our definition of a stable model is an extension of the definition for programs with
nested expressions.
7We underline the set X in ΠX to distinguish this definition of a reduct from the one from the
previous section.
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Proposition 2. For any program Π with nested expressions, the collections of sta-
ble models of Π according to our definition and according to [Lifschitz et al., 1999]
are identical.
2.3 Relationship with Equilibrium Logic
Equilibrium logic [Pearce, 1997, 1999] is defined in terms of Kripke models in the
logic of here-and-there, a logic intermediate between intuitionistic and classical
logic.
The logic of here-and-there is a 3-valued logic, where an interpretation (called
an HT-interpretation) is represented by a pair (X,Y ) of sets of atoms where X ⊆
Y . Intuitively, atoms in X are considered “true”, atoms not in Y are considered
“false”, and all other atoms (that belong to Y but not X) are “undefined”.
An HT-interpretation (X,Y ) satisfies a formula F (symbolically, (X,Y ) |= F )
based on the following recursive definition (a stands for an atom):
• (X,Y ) |= a iff a ∈ X,
• (X,Y ) 6|= ⊥,
• (X,Y ) |= F ∧G iff (X,Y ) |= F and (X,Y ) |= G,
• (X,Y ) |= F ∨G iff (X,Y ) |= F or (X,Y ) |= G,
• (X,Y ) |= F → G iff (X,Y ) |= F implies (X,Y ) |= G, and Y satisfies
F → G in classical logic.
An HT-interpretation (X,Y ) satisfies a propositional theory if it satisfies all the
elements of the theory. Two formulas are equivalent in the logic of here-and-there
if they are satisfied by the same HT-interpretations.
Equilibrium logic defines when a set X of atoms is an equilibrium model of a
propositional theory Γ. Set X is an equilibrium model of Γ if (X,X) |= Γ and,
for all proper subsets Z of X, (Z,X) 6|= Γ.
A relationship between the concept of a model in the logic of here-and-there,
and satisfaction of the reduct exists.
Proposition 3. For any formula F and any HT-interpretation (X,Y ), (X,Y ) |= F
iff X |= F Y .
Next proposition compares the concept of an equilibrium model with the new
definition of a stable model.
Proposition 4. For any theory, its models in the sense of equilibrium logic are
identical to its stable models.
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This proposition offers another way of proving Proposition 2, as [Lifschitz et al., 2001]
showed that the equilibrium models of a program with nested expressions are the
stable models of the same program in the sense of [Lifschitz et al., 1999].
2.4 Properties of propositional theories
This section shows how several theorems about logic programs with nested expres-
sions can be extended to propositional theories.
2.4.1 Strong equivalence
Two theories Γ1 and Γ2 are strongly equivalent if, for every theory Γ, Γ1 ∪ Γ and
Γ2 ∪ Γ have the same stable models.
Proposition 5. For any two theories Γ1 and Γ2, the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
(i) Γ1 is strongly equivalent to Γ2,
(ii) Γ1 is equivalent to Γ2 in the logic of here-and-there, and
(iii) for each set X of atoms, ΓX1 is equivalent to ΓX2 in classical logic.
The equivalence between (i) and (ii) is essentially Lemma 4 from [Lifschitz et al., 2001]
about equilibrium logic. The equivalence between (i) and (iii) is similar to Theo-
rem 1 from [Turner, 2003] about nested expressions, but simpler and more general.
Notice that (iii) cannot be replaced by
(iii’) for each set X of atoms, ΓX1 is equivalent to ΓX2 in classical logic,
not even when Γ1 and Γ2 are programs with nested expressions. Indeed, {p← ¬p}
is strongly equivalent to {⊥ ← ¬p}, but {p← ¬p}∅ = {p← ⊤} is not classically
equivalent to {⊥ ← ¬p}∅ = {⊥ ← ⊤}.
Replacing, in a theory Γ, a (sub)formula F with a formula G is guaranteed
to preserve strong equivalence iff F is strongly equivalent to G. Indeed, strong
equivalence between F and G is clearly a necessary condition: take Γ = {F}.
It is also sufficient because — as in classical logic — replacements of formulas
with equivalent formulas in the logic of here-and-there preserves equivalence in
the same logic.
Cabalar and Ferraris [2007] showed that any propositional theory is strongly
equivalent to a logic program with nested expressions. That is, a propositional
theory can be seen as a different way of writing a logic program. This shows that
the concept of a stable model for propositional theories is not too different from
the concept of a stable model for a logic program.
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2.4.2 Other properties
To state several propositions below, we need the following definitions. Recall that
an expression of the form ¬F is an abbreviation for F → ⊥, and equivalences
are the conjunction of two opposite implications. An occurrence of an atom in
a formula is positive if it is in the antecedent of an even number of implications.
An occurrence is strictly positive if such number is 0, and negative if it odd.8 For
instance, in a formula (p → r) → q, the occurrences of p and q are positive, the
one of r is negative, and the one of q is strictly positive.
The following proposition is an extension of the property that in each stable
model of a program, each atom occurs in the head of a rule of that program [Lifschitz, 1996,
Section 3.1]. An atom is an head atom of a theory Γ if it has a strictly positive oc-
currence in Γ. 9
Proposition 6. Each stable model of a theory Γ consists of head atoms of Γ.
A rule is called a constraint if its head is ⊥. In a logic program, adding con-
straints to a program Π removes the stable models of Π that don’t satisfy the con-
straints. A constraint can be seen as a formula of the form ¬F , a formula that
doesn’t have head atoms. Next proposition generalizes the property of logic pro-
grams stated above to propositional theories.
Proposition 7. For every two propositional theories Γ1 and Γ2 such that Γ2 has no
head atoms, a set X of atoms is a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2 iff X is a stable model
of Γ1 and X |= Γ2.
The following two propositions are generalizations of propositions stated in [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b]
in the case of logic programs. We say that an occurrence of an atom is in the scope
of negation when it occurs in a formula ¬F .
Proposition 8 (Lemma on Explicit Definitions). Let Γ be any propositional theory,
and Q a set of atoms not occurring in Γ. For each q ∈ Q, let Def(q) be a formula
that doesn’t contain any atoms from Q. Then X 7→ X \Q is a 1–1 correspondence
between the stable models of Γ ∪ {Def(q) → q : q ∈ Q} and the stable models
of Γ.
Proposition 9 (Completion Lemma). Let Γ be any propositional theory, and Q a
set of atoms that have positive occurrences in Γ only in the scope of negation. For
each q ∈ Q, let Def(q) be a formula such that all negative occurrences of atoms
8The concept of a positive and negative occurrence of an atom should not be confused by the
concept of a “positive” and “negative” atom mentioned at the end of Section 2.1.
9In case of programs with nested expressions, it is easy to check that head atoms are atoms that
occur in the head of a rule outside the scope of negation ¬.
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from Q in Def(q) are in the scope of negation. Then Γ ∪ {Def(q)→ q : q ∈ Q}
and Γ ∪ {Def(q)↔ q : q ∈ Q} have the same stable models.
The following proposition is essentially a generalization of the splitting set the-
orem from [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] and [Erdog˘an and Lifschitz, 2004], which
allows to break logic programs/propositional theories into parts and compute the
stable models separately. A formulation of this theorem has also been stated
in [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005a] in the special case of theories consisting of a sin-
gle formula.
Proposition 10 (Splitting Set Theorem). Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two theories such that
no atom occurring in Γ1 is a head atom of Γ2. Let S be a set of atoms containing
all head atoms of Γ1 but no head atoms of Γ2. A set X of atoms is a stable model of
Γ1 ∪Γ2 iff X ∩S is a stable model of Γ1 and X is a stable model of (X ∩S)∪Γ2.
2.5 Computational complexity
Since the concept of a stable model is equivalent to the concept of an equilib-
rium model, checking the existence of a stable model of a propositional theory
is a ΣP2 -complete problem as for equilibrium models [Pearce et al., 2001]. No-
tice that the existence of a stable model of a disjunctive program is already ΣP2 -
hard [Eiter and Gottlob, 1993, Corollary 3.8].
The existence of a stable model for a traditional program is a NP-complete
problem [Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1991]. The same holds, more generally, for
logic programs with nested expressions where the head of each rule is an atom or
⊥. (We call programs of this kind nondisjunctive). We may wonder if the same
property holds for arbitrary sets of formulas of the form F → a and F → ⊥. The
answer is negative: the following lemma shows that as soon as we allow implica-
tions in formulas F then we have the same expressivity — and then complexity —
as disjunctive rules.
Lemma 1. Rule
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm → a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an
(n > 0,m ≥ 0) where a1, . . . , an are atoms and l1, . . . , lm are literals, is strongly
equivalent to the set of n implications (i = 1, . . . , n)
(l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm ∧ (a1 → ai) ∧ · · · ∧ (an → ai))→ ai. (5)
Proposition 11. The problem of the existence of a stable model of a theory con-
sisting of formulas of the form F → a and F → ⊥ is ΣP2 -complete.
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We will see, in Section 3.5, that the conjunctive terms in the antecedent of (5)
can equivalently be replaced by aggregates of a simple kind, thus showing that al-
lowing aggregates in nondisjunctive programs increases their computational com-
plexity.
3 Aggregates
3.1 Syntax and semantics
A formula with aggregates is defined recursively as follows:
• atoms and ⊥ are formulas with aggregates10,
• propositional combinations of formulas with aggregates are formulas with
aggregates, and
• any expression of the form
op〈{F1 = w1, . . . , Fn = wn}〉 ≺ N (6)
where
– op is (a symbol for) a function from multisets of real numbers to R ∪
{−∞,+∞} (such as sum, product, min, max, etc.),
– F1, . . . , Fn are formulas with aggregates, and w1, . . . , wn are (symbols
for) real numbers (“weights”),
– ≺ is (a symbol for) a binary relation between real numbers, such as ≤
and =, and
– N is (a symbol for) a real number,
is a formula with aggregates.
A theory with aggregates is a set of formulas with aggregates. A formula of the
form (6) is called an aggregate.
The intuitive meaning of an aggregate is explained by the following clause,
which extends the definition of satisfaction of propositional formulas to arbitrary
formulas with aggregates. For any aggregate (6) and any set X of atoms, let WX
be the multiset W consisting of the weights wi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that X |= Fi; we
say that X satisfies (6) if op(WX) ≺ N . For instance,
sum〈{p = 1, q = 1}〉 6= 1 (7)
10Recall that ⊤ is an abbreviation for ⊥ → ⊥
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is satisfied by the sets of atoms that satisfy both p and q or none of them.
As usual, we say that X satisfies a theory Γ with aggregates if X satisfies all
formulas in Γ. We extend the concept of classical equivalence to formulas/theories
with aggregates.
We extend the definition of a stable models of propositional theories (Section 2)
to cover aggregates, in a very natural way. Let X be a set of atoms. The reduct FX
of a formula F with aggregates relative to X is again the result of replacing each
maximal formula not satisfied by X with ⊥. That is, it is sufficient to add a clause
relative to aggregates to the recursive definition of a reduct: for an aggregate A of
the form (6),
AX =
{
op〈{FX1 = w1, . . . , F
X
n = wn}〉 ≺ N, if X |= A,
⊥, otherwise.
This is similar to the clause for binary connectives:
(F ⊗G)X =
{
FX ⊗GX , if X |= F ⊗G,
⊥, otherwise.
The rest of the definition of a stable model remains the same: the reduct ΓX of
a theory Γ with aggregates is {FX : F ∈ Γ}, and X is a stable model of Γ if X is
a minimal model of ΓX .
Consider, for instance, the theory Γ consisting of one formula
sum〈{p = −1, q = 1}〉 ≥ 0→ q. (8)
Set {q} is a stable model of Γ. Indeed, since both the antecedent and consequent
of (8) are satisfied by {q}, Γ{q} is
sum〈{⊥ = −1, q = 1}〉 ≥ 0→ q.
The antecedent of the implication above is satisfied by every set of atoms, so the
whole formula is equivalent to q. Consequently, {q} is the minimal model of Γ{q},
and then a stable model of Γ.
3.2 Aggregates as Propositional Formulas
A formula/theory with aggregates can also be seen as a normal propositional for-
mula/theory, by identifying (6) with the formula∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
((∧
i∈I
Fi
)
→
(∨
i∈I
Fi
))
, (9)
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where I stands for {1, . . . , n} \ I , and 6≺ is the negation of ≺.
For instance, if we consider aggregate (7), the conjunctive terms in (9) cor-
respond to the cases when the sum of weights is 1, that is, when I = {1} and
I = {2}. The two implications are q → p and p→ q respectively, so that (7) is
(q → p) ∧ (p→ q). (10)
Similarly,
sum〈{p = 1, q = 1}〉 = 1 (11)
is
(p ∨ q) ∧ ¬(p ∧ q). (12)
Even though (11) can be seen as the negation of (7), the negation of (12) is not
strongly equivalent to (10) (although they are classically equivalent). This shows
that it is generally incorrect to “move” a negation from a binary relation symbol
(such as 6=) in front of the aggregate as the unary connective ¬, and vice versa.
Next proposition shows that this understanding of aggregates as propositional
formulas is equivalent to the semantics for theories with aggregates of the previous
section. Two formulas with aggregates are classically equivalent to each other if
they are satisfied by the same sets of atoms.
Proposition 12. Let A be an aggregate of the form (6) and let G be the corre-
sponding formula (9). Then
(a) G is classically equivalent to A, and
(b) for any set X of atoms, GX is classically equivalent to AX .
Treating aggregates as propositional formulas allows us to apply many proper-
ties of propositional theories presented in Section 2.4 to theories with aggregates
also. Consequently, we have the concept of an head atom, of strong equivalence,
we can use the completion lemma and so on. We will use several of those properties
to prove Proposition 14 below. In the rest of the paper we will often make no dis-
tinctions between the two ways of defining the semantics of aggregates discussed
here.
Notice that replacing, in a theory, an aggregate of the form (6) with a for-
mula that is not strongly equivalent to the corresponding formula (9) may lead
to different stable models. This shows that there is no other way (modulo strong
equivalence) of representing our aggregates as propositional formulas.
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3.3 Monotone Aggregates
An aggregate op〈{F1 = w1, . . . , Fn = wn}〉 ≺ N is monotone if, for each pair
of multisets W1, W2 such that W1 ⊆ W2 ⊆ {w1, . . . , wn}, op(W2) ≺ N is true
whenever op(W1) ≺ N is true. The definition of an antimonotone aggregate is
similar, with W1 ⊆W2 replaced by W2 ⊆W1.
For instance,
sum〈{p = 1, q = 1}〉 > 1 (13)
is monotone, and
sum〈{p = 1, q = 1}〉 < 1. (14)
is antimonotone. An example of an aggregate that is neither monotone nor anti-
monotone is (7).
Proposition 13. For any aggregate op〈{F1 = w1, . . . , Fn = wn}〉 ≺ N , for-
mula (9) is strongly equivalent to ∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(∨
i∈I
Fi
) (15)
if the aggregate is monotone, and to∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(
¬
∧
i∈I
Fi
) (16)
if the aggregate is antimonotone.
In other words, if op〈S〉 ≺ N is monotone then the antecedents of the impli-
cations in (9) can be dropped. Similarly, in case of antimonotone aggregates, the
consequents of these implications can be replaced by⊥. In both cases, (9) is turned
into a nested expression, if F1, . . . , Fn are nested expressions.
For instance, aggregate (13) is normally written as formula
(p ∨ q) ∧ (p→ q) ∧ (q → p).
Since the aggregate is monotone, it can also be written, by Proposition 13, as nested
expression
(p ∨ q) ∧ q ∧ p,
which is strongly equivalent to q ∧ p. Similarly, aggregate (14) is normally written
as formula
((p ∧ q)→ ⊥) ∧ (p→ q) ∧ (q → p);
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since the aggregate is nonmonotone, it can also be written as nested expression
¬(p ∧ q) ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬q,
which is strongly equivalent to ¬p ∧ ¬q.
On the other hand, if an aggregate is neither monotone nor antimonotone, it
may be not possible to find a nested expression strongly equivalent to (9), even if
F1, . . . , Fn are nested expressions. This is the case for (7). Indeed, the formula (9)
corresponding to (7) is (10), whose reduct relative to {p, q} is (10). Consequently,
by Proposition 5, for any formula G strongly equivalent to (10), G{p,q} is classi-
cally equivalent to (10). On the other hand, the reduct of nested expressions are
essentially AND-OR combinations of atoms, ⊤ and ⊥ (negations either become ⊥
or ⊤ in the reduct), and no formula of this kind is classically equivalent to (10).
In some uses of ASP, aggregates that are neither monotone nor antimonotone
are essential, as discussed in the next section.
3.4 Example
We consider the following variation of the combinatorial auction problem [Baral and Uyan, 2001],
which can be naturally formalized using an aggregate that is neither monotone nor
antimonotone.
Joe wants to move to another town and has the problem of removing all his
bulky furniture from his old place. He has received some bids: each bid may be for
one piece or several pieces of furniture, and the amount offered can be negative (if
the value of the pieces is lower than the cost of removing them). A junkyard will
take any object not sold to bidders, for a price. The goal is to find a collection of
bids for which Joe doesn’t lose money, if there is any.
Assume that there are n bids, denoted by atoms b1, . . . , bn. We express by the
formulas
bi ∨ ¬bi (17)
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) that Joe is free to accept any bid or not. Clearly, Joe cannot accept two
bids that involve the selling of the same piece of furniture. So, for every such pair
i, j of bids, we include the formula
¬(bi ∧ bj). (18)
Next, we need to express which pieces of the furniture have not been given to
bidders. If there are m objects we can express that an object i is sold by bid j by
adding the rule
bj → si (19)
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to our theory.
Finally, we need to express that Joe doesn’t lose money by selling his items.
This is done by the aggregate
sum〈{b1 = w1, . . . , bn = wn,¬s1 = −c1, . . . ,¬sm = −cm}〉 ≥ 0, (20)
where each wi is the amount of money (possibly negative) obtained by accepting
bid i, and each ci is the money requested by the junkyard to remove item i. Note
that (20) is neither monotone nor antimonotone.
We define a solution to Joe’s problem as a set of accepted bids such that
(a) the bids involve selling disjoint sets of items, and
(b) the sum of the money earned from the bids is greater than the money spent
giving away the remaining items.
Proposition 14. X 7→ {i : bi ∈ X} is a 1–1 correspondence between the sta-
ble models of the theory consisting of formulas (17)–(20) and a solution to Joe’s
problem.
3.5 Computational Complexity
Since theories with aggregates generalize disjunctive programs, the problem of the
existence of a stable model of a theory with aggregates clearly is ΣP2 -hard.11 We
need to check in which class of the computational hierarchy this problem belongs.
Even if propositional formulas corresponding to aggregates can be exponen-
tially larger than the original aggregate, it turns out that (by treating aggregates as
primitive constructs) the computation is not harder than for propositional theories.
Proposition 15. If, for every aggregate, computing op(W ) ≺ N requires poly-
nomial time then the existence of a stable model of a theory with aggregates is a
ΣP2 -complete problem.
For a nondisjunctive program with nested expressions the existence of a stable
model is NP-complete. If we allow nonnested aggregates in the body, for instance
by allowing rules
A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → a
(A1, . . . , An are aggregates and a is an atom or⊥) then the complexity increases to
ΣP2 . This follows from Lemma 1, since, in (5), each formula li is the propositional
11We are clearly assuming weight not to be arbitrary real numbers but to belong to a countable
subset of real numbers, such as integers of floating point numbers.
19
monotone/antimonotone generic anti-chain
aggregates aggregates property
weight constraints NP-complete NP-complete NO
PDB-aggregates NP-complete Σ2P -complete YES
FLP-aggregates NP-complete Σ2P -complete YES
our aggregates NP-complete Σ2P -complete NO
Figure 4: Properties of definitions of programs with aggregates, in the case in
which the head of each rule is an atom. We limit the syntax of our aggregates
to the syntax allowed by the other formalisms. The complexity is relative to the
problem of the existence of a stable model. The anti-chain property holds when no
stable model can be a subset of another one.
representation of sum〈{li = 1}〉 ≥ 1; similarly, each aj → ai is the propositional
representation of sum〈{aj = −1, ai = 1}〉 ≥ 0.
However, if we allow monotone and antimonotone aggregates only — even
nested — in the antecedent, we are in class NP.
Proposition 16. Consider theories with aggregates consisting of formulas of the
form
F → a,
where a is an atom or ⊥, and F contains monotone and antimonotone aggregates
only, no equivalences and no implications other than negations. If, for every ag-
gregate, computing op(W ) ≺ N requires polynomial time then the problem of the
existence of a stable model of theories of this kind is an NP-complete problem.
Similar results have been independently proven in [Calimeri et al., 2005] for
FLP-aggregates.
3.6 Other Formalisms
Figure 4 already shows that there are several differences between the various defi-
nitions of an aggregate. We analyze that more in details in the rest of this section.
3.6.1 Programs with weight constraints
Weight constraints are aggregates defined in [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000] and im-
plemented in answer set solver SMODELS. We simplify the syntax of weight con-
straints and of programs with weight constraints for clarity, without reducing its
semantical expressivity.
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Weight constraints are expressions of the form
N ≤ {l1 = w1, . . . , lm = wm} (21)
and
{l1 = w1, . . . , lm = wm} ≤ N (22)
where
• N is (a symbol for) a real number,
• each of l1, . . . , ln is a (symbol for) a literal, and w1, . . . , wn are (symbols
for) real numbers.
An example of a weight constraint is (1).
The intuitive meaning of (21) is that the sum of the weights wi for all the li
that are true is not lower than N . For (22) the sum of weights is not greater than
N . Often, N1 ≤ S and S ≤ N2 are written together as N1 ≤ S ≤ N2. If a weight
w is 1 then the part “= w” is generally omitted. If all weights are 1 then a weight
constraint is called a cardinality constraint.
A rule with weight constraints is an expression of the form
a← C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn (23)
where a is an atom or ⊥, and C1, . . . , Cn (n ≥ 0) are weight constraints.
Finally, a program with weight constraints is a set of rules with weight con-
straints. Rules/programs with cardinality constraints are rules/programs with weight
constraints containing cardinality constraints only.
Programs with cardinality/weight constraints can be seen as a generalization
of traditional programs, by identifying each literal l in the body of each rule with
cardinality constraint 1 ≤ {l}.
The definition of a stable model from [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000] requires
first the elimination of negative weights from weight constraints. This is done by
replacing each term li = wi where wi is negative with li = −wi (li is the literal
complementary to li) and increasing the bound by −wi. For instance,
0 ≤ {p = 2, q = −1}
is rewritten as
1 ≤ {p = 2,¬q = 1}.
Then [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000] proposes a definition of a reduct and of a
stable model for programs with weight constraints without negative weights. For
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this paper, we prefer showing a translational, equivalent semantics of such pro-
grams from [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b], that consists in replacing each weight
constraint C with a nested expression [C], preserving the stable models of the pro-
gram: if C is (21) then [C] is (I ⊆ {1, . . . , n})∨
I : N≤
P
i∈I
wi
(∧
i∈I
li
) (24)
and if C is (22) then [C] is
¬
∨
I : N<
P
i∈I
wi
(∧
i∈I
li
)
. (25)
It turns out that the way of understanding a weight constraint C of this paper is
not different from [C] when all weights are nonnegative.
Proposition 17. In presence of nonnegative weights only, [N ≤ S] is strongly
equivalent to sum〈S〉 ≥ N , and [S ≤ N ] is strongly equivalent to sum〈S〉 ≤ N .
From this proposition, Propositions 2 and 5 of this paper, and Theorem 1
from [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b] it follows that our concept of an aggregate
captures the concept of weight constraints defined in [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000]
when all weights are nonnegative. It also captures the absence of the anti-chain
property of its stable models: for instance,
p← {¬p} ≤ 0
has stable models ∅ and {p} in both formalisms.
When we consider negative weights, however, such correspondence doesn’t
hold. For instance,
p← 0 ≤ {p = 2, p = −1}, (26)
according to [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000], has no stable models, while
p← sum〈{p = 2, p = −1}〉 ≥ 0 (27)
has stable model ∅. An explanation of this difference can be seen in the pre-
processing proposed by [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000] that eliminates negative weights.
For us, weight constraint 0 ≤ {p = 2, p = −1}, and the result 1 ≤ {p = 2,¬p =
1} of eliminating its negative weight, are semantically different.12 Surprisingly,
12The fact that the process of eliminating negative weights is somehow unintuitive was already
mentioned in [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b] with the same example proposed in this section.
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under the semantics of [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000], 0 ≤ {p = 2, p = −1} is
different from 0 ≤ {p = 1}. In fact,
p← 0 ≤ {p = 1} (28)
has stable model ∅, the same of (27), while (26) has none. Notice that summing
weights that are all positive or all negative preserves stable models under both
semantics.
The preliminary step of removing negative weights can be seen as a way of
making weight constraints either monotone or antimonotone. This keeps the prob-
lem of the existence of a stable model in class NP, while we have seen in Section 3.5
that, under our semantics, even simple aggregates with the same intuitive meaning
of 0 ≤ {p = 1, q = −1} bring the same problem to class ΣP2 .
3.6.2 PDB-aggregates
A PDB-aggregate is an expression of the form (6), where F1, . . . , Fn are literals.
A program with PDB-aggregates is a set of rules of the form
a← A1 ∧ · · · ∧Am,
where m ≥ 0, a is an atom and A1, . . . , Am are PDB-aggregates.
As in the case of programs with weight constraints, a program with PDB-
aggregates is a generalization of a traditional program, by identifying each literal l
in the bodies of traditional programs by aggregate sum〈{l = 1}〉 ≥ 1.
The semantics of [Pelov et al., 2003] for programs with PDB-aggregates is
based on a procedure that transforms programs with such aggregates into tradi-
tional programs.13 The procedure can be seen consisting of two parts. The first
one essentially consists in rewriting each aggregate as a nested expression.14 The
second part “unfolds” each rule into a strongly equivalent set of traditional rules.
For our comparisons, only the first part is needed: each PDB-aggregate A of the
form
op〈{l1 = w1, . . . , ln = wn}〉 ≺ N
is replaced by the following nested expression Atr∨
I1,I2:I1⊆I2⊆{1,...,n} and for all I such that I1 ⊆ I ⊆ I2, op(WI) ≺ N
G(I1,I2)
13A semantics for such aggregates was proposed in [Denecker et al., 2001], based on the approx-
imation theory [Denecker et al., 2002]. But the first characterization of PDB-aggregates in terms of
stable models is from [Pelov et al., 2003]. [Son et al., 2007] independently proposed a similar se-
mantics.
14[Pelov et al., 2003] doesn’t explicitly mention nested expressions.
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where WI stands for the multiset {wi : i ∈ I}, and G(I1,I2) stands for∧
i∈I1
li,
∧
i∈{1,...,n}\I2
li.
For instance, for the PDB-aggregate A = sum〈{p = −1, q = 1}〉 ≥ 0, if we
take F1 = p, F2 = q then the pairs (I1, I2) that “contribute” to the disjunction in
Atr are
(∅, ∅) ({2}, {2}) ({1, 2}, {1, 2}) (∅, {2}) ({2}, {1, 2}).
The corresponding nested expressions G(I1,I2) are
¬p ∧ ¬q q ∧ ¬p p ∧ q ¬p q.
It can be shown, using strong equivalent transformations (see Proposition 5) that
the disjunction of such nested expressions can be rewritten as ¬p ∨ q.
In case of monotone and antimonotone PDB-aggregates and in the absence of
negation as failure, the semantics of Pelov et al. is equivalent to ours.
Proposition 18. For any monotone or antimonotone PDB-aggregates A of the
form (6) where F1, . . . , Fn are atoms, Atr is strongly equivalent to (9).
The claim above is generally not true when either the aggregates are not mono-
tone or antimonotone, or when some formula in the aggregate is a negative lit-
eral. Relatively to aggregates that are neither monotone nor antimonotone, the
semantics of [Pelov et al., 2003] seems to have the same unintuitive behaviour
of [Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000]: for instance, according to [Pelov et al., 2003], (27)
has no stable models while
p← sum〈{p = 1}〉 ≥ 0
has stable model {p}.
To illustrate the problem with negative literals, consider the following Π:
p← sum〈{q = 1}〉 < 1
q ← ¬p
(29)
and Π′:
p← sum〈{¬p = 1}〉 < 1
q ← ¬p
(30)
Intuitively, the two programs should have the same stable models. Indeed, the
operation of replacing q with ¬p in the first rule of Π should not affect the stable
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models since the second rule “defines” q as ¬p: it is the only rule with q in the head.
However, under the semantics of [Pelov et al., 2003], Π has stable model {p} only
and Π′ has stable model {q} also. Under our semantics, both (29) and (30) have
stable models {p} and {q}.
Note that already the first rule of (30) has different stable models under the two
semantics. Under ours, they are ∅ and {p}. According to [Pelov et al., 2003], only
the empty set is a stable model; it couldn’t have both stable models because stable
models as defined in [Pelov et al., 2003] have the anti-chain property.
3.6.3 FLP-aggregates
An FLP-aggregate is an expression of the form (6) where each of F1, . . . , Fn is
a conjunction of literals. A program with FLP-aggregates is a set of rules of the
form
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an ← A1 ∧ · · · ∧Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ap (31)
where n ≥ 0, 0 ≤ m ≤ p, a1, . . . , an are atoms and A1, . . . , Ap are FLP-
aggregates.
A program with FLP-aggregates is a generalization of a disjunctive program,
by identifying each atom a in the bodies of disjunctive rules by aggregate sum〈{a =
1}〉 ≥ 1.
The semantics of [Faber et al., 2004] defines when a set of atoms is a stable
model for a program with FLP-aggregates. The definition of satisfaction of an ag-
gregate is identical to ours. The reduct, however, is computed differently. The
reduct ΠX of a program Π with FLP-aggregates relative to a set X of atoms con-
sists of the rules of the form (31) such that X satisfies its body. Set X is a stable
model for Π if X is a minimal set satisfying ΠX .
For instance, let Π be the FLP-program
p← sum〈{p = 2}〉 ≥ 1.
The only stable model of Π is the empty set. Indeed, since the empty set doesn’t
satisfy the aggregate, Π∅ = ∅, which has ∅ as the unique minimal model; we can
conclude that ∅ is a stable model of Π. On the other hand, Π{p} = Π because {p}
satisfies the aggregate in Π. Since ∅ |= Π, {p} is not a minimal model of Π{p} and
then it is not a stable model of Π.
This definition of a reduct is different from all other definitions of a reduct de-
scribed in this paper (and also from many other definitions), in the sense that it
may leave negation ¬ in the body of a rule. For instance, the reduct of a ← ¬b
relative to {a} is according to those definitions the fact a. In the theory of FLP-
aggregates, the reduct doesn’t modify the rule. On the other hand, this definition
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of a stable model is equivalent to the definition of a stable model in the sense
of [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] (and successive definitions) when applied to dis-
junctive programs.
Next proposition shows a relationship between our concept of an aggregate and
FLP-aggregates. An FLP-program is positive if, in each formula (31), p = m.
Next proposition shows that our semantics of aggregates is essentially an ex-
tension of the
Proposition 19. The stable models of a positive FLP-program under our semantics
are identical to its stable models in the sense of [Faber et al., 2004].
The proposition doesn’t apply to arbitrary FLP-aggregates as negation has dif-
ferent meanings in the two semantics. In case of [Faber et al., 2004], ¬(op〈S〉 ≺
N) is essentially the same as op〈S〉 6≺ N , while we have seen, in Section 3.2, that
this fact doesn’t always hold in our semantics. The difference in meaning can be
seen in the following example. Program
p←¬q
q ←sum〈{p = 1}〉 ≤ 0
(32)
has two stable models {p} and {q} according to both semantics. However, if we
replace q in the first rule with the body of the second (q is “defined” as sum〈{p =
1}〉 ≤ 0 by the second rule), we get program
p←¬(sum〈{p = 1}〉 ≤ 0)
q ←sum〈{p = 1}〉 ≤ 0,
(33)
which, according to [Faber et al., 2004], has only stable model {q}. We find it
unintuitive.
It is the first rule of (33) that has a different meaning in the two semantics. The
rule alone has different stable models: according to [Faber et al., 2004], its only
stable models is ∅. Under our semantics, the stable models are ∅ and {p}. As they
don’t have the anti-chain property, there is no program with FLP-aggregates that
has such stable models under [Faber et al., 2004].
As a program with FLP-aggregate can be easily rewritten as a positive program
with FLP-aggregate, our definition of an aggregate essentially generalizes the one
of [Faber et al., 2004].
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4 Proofs
4.1 Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
Lemma 2. For any formulas F1, . . . , Fn (n ≥ 0), any set X of atoms, and any
connective ⊗ ∈ {∨,∧}, (F1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Fn)X is classically equivalent to FX1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
FXn .
Proof. Case 1: X |= F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn. Then, by the definition of reduct, (F1 ∧ · · · ∧
Fn)
X = FX1 ∧· · ·∧F
X
2 . Case 2: X 6|= F1∧· · ·∧Fn. Then (F1⊗· · ·⊗Fn)X = ⊥;
moreover, one of F1, . . . , Fn is not satisfied by X, so that one of FX1 , . . . , FXn is
⊥. The case of disjunction is similar.
Proposition 3. For any formula F and any HT-interpretation (X,Y ), (X,Y ) |= F
iff X |= F Y .
Proof. It is sufficient to consider the case when Γ is a singleton {F}, where F
contains only connectives ∧, ∨, → and ⊥. The proof is by structural induction on
F .
• F is ⊥. X 6|= ⊥ and (X,Y ) 6|= ⊥.
• F is an atom a. X |= aY iff Y |= a and X |= a. Since X ⊆ Y , this means
iff X |= a, which is the condition for which (X,Y ) |= a.
• F has the form G∧H . X |= (G∧H)Y iff X |= GY ∧HY by Lemma 2, and
then iff X |= GY and X |= HY . This is equivalent, by induction hypothesis,
to say that (X,Y ) |= G and (X,Y ) |= H , and then that (X,Y ) |= G ∧H .
• The proof for disjunction is similar to the proof for conjunction.
• F has the form G → H . X |= (G → H)Y iff X |= GY → HY and
Y |= G→ H , and then iff
X |= GY implies X |= HY , and Y |= G→ H.
This is equivalent, by the induction hypothesis, to
(X,Y ) |= G implies (X,Y ) |= H , and Y |= G→ H,
which is the definition of (X,Y ) |= G→ H .
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Proposition 4. For any theory, its models in the sense of equilibrium logic are
identical to its stable models.
Proof. A set Y of atoms is an equilibrium model of Γ iff
(Y, Y ) |= Γ and, for all proper subsets X of Y , (X,Y ) 6|= Γ.
In view of Proposition 3, this is equivalent to the condition
Y |= ΓY and, for all proper subsets X of Y , X 6|= ΓY .
which means that Y is a stable model of Γ.
4.2 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
We first need the recursive definition of reduct for programs with nested expres-
sions from [Lifschitz et al., 1999]. The reduct FX of a nested expression F rela-
tive to a set X of atoms, as follows:
• aX = a, ⊥X = ⊥ and ⊤X = ⊤,
• (F ∧G)X = FX ∧GX and (F ∨G)X = FX ∨GX ,
• (¬F )X =
{
⊥ , if X |= F ,
⊤ , otherwise,
Then the reduct (F ← G)X of a rule F ← G with with nested expression is
defined as FX ← GX , and the reduct ΠX of a program with nested expressions as
the union of the reduct of its rules.
Lemma 3. The reduct FX of a nested expression F is equivalent, in the sense of
classical logic, to the nested expression obtained from FX by replacing all atoms
that do not belong to X by ⊥.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on F .
• When F is ⊥ or ⊤ then FX = F = FX .
• For an atom a, aX = a. The claim is immediate.
• Let F be a negation ¬G . If X |= G then FX = ⊥ = FX ; otherwise,
FX = ¬⊥ = ⊤ = FX .
• for F = G ⊗H(⊗ ∈ {∨,∧}), FX is GX ⊗HX , and, by Lemma 2, FX is
equivalent to GX⊗HX . The claim now follows by the induction hypothesis.
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Proposition 1. For any program Π with nested expressions and any set X of atoms,
ΠX is equivalent, in the sense of classical logic,
• to ⊥, if X 6|= Π, and
• to the program obtained from ΠX by replacing all atoms that do not belong
to X by ⊥, otherwise.
Proof. If X 6|= Π then clearly ΠX contains ⊥. Otherwise, ΠX consists of formulas
FX → GX for each rule G ← F ∈ Π, and consequently for each rule GX ←
FX ∈ ΠX . Since each F and G is a nested expression, the claim is immediate by
Lemma 3.
Proposition 2. For any program Π with nested expressions, the collection of stable
models of Π according to our definition and according to [Lifschitz et al., 1999] are
identical.
Proof. If X 6|= Π then clearly ΠX contains ⊥, and also X 6|= ΠX (a well-known
property about programs with nested expressions), so X is not a stable model under
either definitions. Otherwise, by Corollary 1, the two reducts are satisfied by the
same subsets of X. Then X is a minimal set satisfying ΠX iff it is a minimal set
satisfying ΠX , and, by the definitions of a stable models X is a stable model of Π
either for both definitions or for none of them.
4.3 Proofs of Propositions 5–7
Proposition 5. For any two theories Γ1 and Γ2, the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
(i) Γ1 is strongly equivalent to Γ2,
(ii) Γ1 is equivalent to Γ2 in the logic of here-and-there, and
(iii) for each set X of atoms, ΓX1 is equivalent to ΓX2 in classical logic.
Proof. We will prove the equivalence between (i) and (ii) and between (ii) and (iii).
We start with the former. Lemma 4 from [Lifschitz et al., 2001] tells that, for any
two theories, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) for every theory Γ, theories Γ1 ∪ Γ and Γ2 ∪ Γ have the same equilibrium
models, and
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(b) Γ1 is equivalent to Γ2 in the logic of here-and-there.
Condition (b) is identical to (ii). Condition (a) can be rewritten, by Proposition 4,
as
(a′) for every theory Γ, theories Γ1 ∪ Γ and Γ2 ∪ Γ have the same stable models,
which means that Γ1 is strongly equivalent to Γ2.
It remains to prove the equivalence between (ii) and (iii). Theory Γ1 is equiva-
lent to Γ2 in the logic of here-and-there iff, for every set Y of atoms, the following
condition holds:
for every X ⊆ Y , (X,Y ) |= Γ1 iff (X,Y ) |= Γ2.
This condition is equivalent, by Proposition 3, to
for every X ⊆ Y , X |= ΓY1 iff X |= ΓY2 .
Since ΓY1 and ΓY2 contain atoms from Y only (the other atoms are replaced by ⊥
in the reduct), this last condition expresses equivalence between ΓY1 and ΓY2 .
Lemma 4. For any theory Γ, let S be a set of atoms that contains all head atoms
of Γ. For any set X of atoms, if X |= Γ then X ∩ S |= ΓX .
Proof. It is clearly sufficient to prove the claim for Γ that is a singleton {F}. The
proof is by induction on F .
• If F = ⊥ then X 6|= F , and the claim is trivial.
• For an atom a, if X |= a then aX = a, but also a ∈ S, so that X ∩ S |= aX .
• If X |= G ∧ H then X |= G and X |= H . Consequently, by induction
hypothesis, X ∩ S |= GX and X ∩ S |= HX . It remains to notice that
(G ∧H)X = GX ∧HX .
• The case of disjunction is similar to the case of conjunction.
• If X |= G → H then (G → H)X = GX → HX . Assume that X ∩
S |= GX . Consequently GX 6= ⊥ and then X |= G. It follows that, since
X |= G → H , X |= H . Since S contains all head atoms of H , the claim
follows by the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 5. For any theory Γ and any set X of atoms, X |= ΓX iff X |= Γ.
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Proof. Reduct ΓX is obtained from Γ by replacing some subformulas that are not
satisfied by X with ⊥.
Proposition 6. Each stable model of a theory Γ consists of head atoms of Γ.
Proof. Consider any theory Γ, the set S of head atoms of Γ, and a stable model
X of Γ. By Lemma 5, X |= Γ, so that, by Lemma 4, X ∩ S |= ΓX . Since
X ∩ S ⊆ X and no proper subset of X satisfies ΓX , it follows that X ∩ S = X,
and consequently that X ⊆ S.
Proposition 7. For every two propositional theories Γ1 and Γ2 such that Γ2 has no
head atoms, a set X of atoms is a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2 iff X is a stable model
of Γ1 and X |= Γ2.
Proof. If X |= Γ2 then ΓX2 is satisfied by every subset of X by Lemma 4, so that
(Γ1 ∪ Γ2)
X is classically equivalent to ΓX1 ; then clearly X is a stable model of
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 iff it is a stable model of Γ1. Otherwise, ΓX2 contains ⊥, and X cannot be
a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2.
4.4 Proofs of Propositions 8 and 10
We start with the proof of Proposition 10. Some lemmas are needed.
Lemma 6. If X is a stable model of Γ then ΓX is equivalent to X.
Proof. Since all atoms that occur in ΓX belong to X, it is sufficient to show that
the formulas are satisfied by the same subsets of X. By the definition of a stable
model, the only subset of X satisfying ΓX is X.
Lemma 7. Let S be a set of atoms that contains all atoms that occur in a theory Γ1
but does not contain any head atoms of a theory Γ2. For any set X of atoms, if X
is a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2 then X ∩ S is a stable model of Γ1.
Proof. Since X is a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2, X |= Γ1, so that X ∩ S |= Γ1, and,
by Lemma 5, X∩S |= ΓX∩S1 . It remains to show that no proper subset Y of X∩S
satisfies ΓX∩S1 . Let S′ be the set of head atoms of Γ2, and let Z be X ∩ (S′ ∪ Y ).
We will show that Z has the following properties:
(i) Z ∩ S = Y ;
(ii) Z ⊂ X;
(iii) Z |= ΓX2 .
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To prove (i), note that since S′ is disjoint from S, and Y is a subset of X ∩ S,
Z ∩ S = X ∩ (S′ ∪ Y ) ∩ S = X ∩ Y ∩ S = (X ∩ S) ∩ Y = Y.
To prove (ii), note that set Z is clearly a subset of X. It cannot be equal to X,
because otherwise we would have, by (i),
Y = Z ∩ S = X ∩ S;
this is impossible, because Y is a proper subset of X ∩ S. Property (iii) follows
from Lemma 4, because X |= Γ2, and S′ ∪ Y contains all head atoms of Γ2.
Since X is a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2, from property (ii) we can conclude that
Z 6|= (Γ1 ∪ Γ2)
X
. Consequently, by property (iii), Z 6|= ΓX1 . Since all atoms that
occur in Γ1 belong to S, ΓX1 = ΓX∩S1 , so that Z 6|= ΓX∩S1 . Since all atoms that
occur in ΓX∩S1 belong to S, it follows that Z ∩ S 6|= ΓX∩S1 . By property (i), we
conclude that Y 6|= ΓX∩S1 .
Proposition 10 (Splitting Set Theorem). Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two theories such that
no atom occurring in Γ1 is a head atom of Γ2. Let S be a set of atoms containing
all head atoms of Γ1 but no head atoms of Γ2. A set X of atoms is a stable model of
Γ1∪Γ2 iff X ∩S is a stable model of Γ1 and X is a stable model of (X ∩S)∪Γ2.
Proof. We first prove the claim in the case when S contains all atoms of Γ1. If
X ∩ S is not a stable model of Γ1 then X is not a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2 by
Lemma 7. Now suppose that X ∩ S is a stable model of Γ1. Then, by Lemma 6,
ΓX∩S1 is equivalent to X ∩ S. Consequently,
(Γ1 ∪ Γ2)
X = ΓX1 ∪ Γ
X
2 = Γ
X∩S
1 ∪ Γ
X
2 ↔ (X ∩ S) ∪ Γ
X
2
= (X ∩ S)X ∪ ΓX2 =
(
(X ∩ S) ∪ Γ2
)X
We can conclude that X is a stable model of Γ1 ∪ Γ2 iff X is a stable model of
Γ2 ∪ (X ∩ S).
The most general case remains. Let S1 be the set of all atoms in Γ1 (the value
of S for which we have already proved the claim). In view of the special case
described above, it is sufficient to show that, for any set S of atoms that respects
the hypothesis conditions,
X ∩ S1 is a stable model of Γ1 and X is a stable model of (X ∩ S1) ∪ Γ2 (34)
holds iff
X ∩ S is a stable model of Γ1 and X is a stable model of (X ∩ S) ∪ Γ2. (35)
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Assume (34). Sets S and S1 differ only for sets of atoms that are not head atoms
of Γ1. Consequently, since X ∩ S1 is a stable model of Γ1, it follows from Propo-
sition 6 that X ∩ S1 = X ∩ S. We can then conclude that (35) follows from (34).
The proof in the opposite direction is similar.
Lemma 8. Let Γ be a theory, and let Y and Z be two disjoint sets of atoms such
that no atom of Z is an head atoms of Γ. Let Γ′ a theory obtained from Γ by
replacing occurrences of atoms of Y with ⊤ and occurrences of atoms of Z with
⊥. Then Γ ∪ Y and Γ′ ∪ Y have the same stable models.
Proof. Atoms of Z are not head atoms of Γ ∪ Y . Consequently, by Proposition 6,
every stable model of Γ ∪ Y is disjoint from Z . It follows, by Proposition 7, that
Γ ∪ Y has the same stable models of
Γ ∪ Y ∪ {¬a : a ∈ Z}.
Similarly, Γ′ ∪ Y has the same stable models of
Γ′ ∪ Y ∪ {¬a : a ∈ Z}.
It is a known property that the two theories above are equivalent to each other
in intuitionistic logic, and then in the logic-of-here-and-there. Consequently, by
Proposition 5, they are strongly equivalent to each other, and we can conclude that
they have the same stable models.
Proposition 8. Let Γ be any propositional theory, and Q a set of atoms not occur-
ring in Γ. For each q ∈ Q, let Def(q) be a formula that doesn’t contain any atoms
from Q. Then X 7→ X \Q is a 1–1 correspondence between the stable models of
Γ ∪ {Def(q)→ q : q ∈ Q} and the stable models of Γ.
Proof. Let Γ2 be {Def(q) → q : q ∈ Q}. Since Q contains all head atoms of
Γ2 but no atom occurring in Γ then, by the splitting set theorem (Proposition 10),
(“s.m.” stands for “a stable model”)
X is s.m. of Γ ∪ Γ2 iff X \Q is s.m. of Γ and X is s.m. of (X \Q) ∪ Γ2. (36)
Clearly, if X is a stable model of Γ ∪ Γ2 then X \Q is a stable model of Γ, which
proves one of the two directions of the 1–1 correspondence in the claim. Now take
any stable model Y of Γ. We need to show that there is exactly one stable model
X of Γ ∪ Γ2 such that X \Q = Y . In view of (36), it is sufficient to show that
Z = Y ∪ {q ∈ Q : Y |= Def(q)}
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is the only stable model X of Y ∪ Γ2, and that Z \Q = Y . This second condition
can be easily verified. Now consider Y ∪ Γ2. By Lemma 8, Y ∪ Γ2 has the same
stable models of
Y ∪ {Def(q)′ → q : q ∈ Q},
where Def(q)′ is obtained from Def(q) by replacing all occurrences of atoms in
it with ⊤ if the atom replaced belongs to Y , and with ⊥ otherwise. This theory
can be further simplified into theory Z . Indeed, Def(q)′ doesn’t contain atoms,
and then it is strongly equivalent to ⊤ or ⊥. In particular, if Y |= Def(q) then
Def(q)′ is strongly equivalent to ⊤, and then Def(q)′ → q is strongly equivalent
to q. Otherwise, Def(q)′ is strongly equivalent to ⊥, and then Def(q)′ → q is
strongly equivalent to ⊤. As Z is a set of atoms, it is easy to verify that its only
stable model is Z itself.
4.5 Proof of Proposition 9
In order to prove the Completion Lemma, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Take any two sets X, Y of atoms such that Y ⊆ X. For any formula F
and any set S of atoms,
(a) if each positive occurrence of an atom from S in F is in the scope of negation
and Y |= FX then Y \ S |= FX , and
(b) if each negative occurrence of an atom from S in F is in the scope of negation
and Y \ S |= FX then Y |= FX .
Proof. • If X 6|= F then FX = ⊥, and the claim is trivial. This covers the
case in which F = ⊥.
• If X |= F and F is an atom a then claim (b) holds because if a ∈ Y \S then
a ∈ Y . For claim (a), if a 6∈ S and a ∈ Y then a ∈ Y \ S.
• If X |= F and F is a conjunction or a disjunction, the claim is almost
immediate by Lemma 2 and induction hypothesis.
• The case in which X |= F and F has the form G → H remains. Clearly,
(G → H)X = GX → HX . Case 1. If G → H is a negation (that is,
H = ⊥) then, since X |= F , X 6|= GX and then FX = ⊤, and the claims
clearly follows. Case 2: H 6= ⊥. We describe a proof of claim (a). The proof
for (b) is similar. Assume that no atom from S has positive occurrences in
G → H outside the scope of the negation, that Y |= GX → HX , and
that Y \ S |= GX . We want to prove that Y \ S |= HX . Notice that no
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atom from S has negative occurrences in G outside the scope of negation;
consequently, by the induction hypothesis (claim (b)), Y |= GX . On the
other hand, Y |= (G → H)X , so that Y |= HX . Since no atom from S has
positive occurrences in H outside the scope of negation, we can conclude
that Y \ S |= HX by induction hypothesis (claim (a)).
Proposition 9 (Completion Lemma) Let Γ be any propositional theory, and Q a
set of atoms that have positive occurrences in Γ only in the scope of negation. For
each q ∈ Q, let Def(q) be a formula such that all negative occurrences of atoms
from Q in Def(q) are in the scope of negation. Then Γ ∪ {Def(q)→ q : q ∈ Q}
and Γ ∪ {Def(q)↔ q : q ∈ Q} have the same stable models.
Proof. Let Γ1 be Γ ∪ {Def(q) → q : q ∈ Q} and let Γ2 be Γ1 ∪ {q →
Def(q) : q ∈ Q}. We want to prove that a set X of atoms is a stable model
of both theories or for none of them. Since ΓX1 ⊆ ΓX2 , ΓX2 entails ΓX1 . If the
opposite entailment holds also then we clearly have that ΓX2 and ΓX1 are satisfied
by the same subsets of X, and the claim immediately follows. Otherwise, for some
Y ⊆ X, Y 6|= ΓX2 and Y |= ΓX1 . First of all, that means that X |= Γ1, so that ΓX1
is equivalent to
ΓX ∪ {Def(q)X → q : q ∈ Q ∩X}.
Secondly, set Y is one of the sets Y ′ having the following properties:
(i) Y ′ \Q = Y \Q, and
(ii) Y ′ |= Def(q)X → q for all q ∈ Q ∩X.
Let Z be the intersection of such sets Y ′, and let ∆ be {q → Def(q)X : q ∈
Q ∩X}. Set Z has the following properties:
(a) Z ⊆ Y ,
(b) Z |= ΓX1 , and
(c) Z |= ∆.
Indeed, claim (a) holds since Y is one of the elements Y ′ of the intersection. To
prove (b), first of all, we observe that Z \ Q = Y \ Q, so that, by (a), there is
a set S ⊆ Q such that Z = Y \ S; as Y |= ΓX and Γ has all positive occur-
rences of atoms from S ⊆ Q in the scope of negation, it follows that Z |= ΓX by
Lemma 9(a). It remains to show that, for any q, if Z |= Def(q)X then q ∈ Z .
Assume that Z |= Def(q)X . Then, since Def(q) has all negative occurrences of
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atoms from Q in the scope of negation, and since all Y ′ whose intersection generate
Z are superset of Z with Y ′ \ Z ⊆ Q, all those Y ′ satisfy Def(q)X by Lemma 9.
By property (ii), we have that q ∈ Y ′ for all Y ′, and then q ∈ Z .
It remains to prove claim (c). Take any q ∈ Z that belongs to Q ∩ X. Set
Y ′ = Z \ {q} satisfies condition (i), but it cannot satisfy (ii), because sets Y ′
that satisfy (i) and (ii) are supersets of Z by construction of Z . Consequently,
Y ′ 6|= Def(q)X . Since all positive occurrences of atom q in Def(q) are in the
scope of negation and Y ′ = Z \ {q}, we can conclude that Z 6|= Def(q)X by
Lemma 9 again.
Now consider two cases. If X 6|= Γ2 then clearly X is not a stable model of
Γ2. It is not a stable model of Γ1 as well. Indeed, since X |= Γ1, we have that, for
some q ∈ Q ∩X, X 6|= Def(q). Consequently, Def(q)X = ⊥ and then X 6|= ∆,
but, since Z |= ∆ by (c) and Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X by (a), Z is a proper subset of X. Since
Z |= ΓX1 by (b), X is not a stable model of Γ1.
In the other case (X |= Γ2) it is not hard to see that ΓX2 is equivalent to ΓX1 ∪∆.
We have that Z |= ΓX1 by (b), and then Z |= ΓX2 by (c). Since Y 6|= ΓX2 , Z 6= Y .
On the other hand, Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X by (a). This means that Z is a proper subset of
X that satisfies ΓX1 and ΓX2 , and we can conclude that X is not an stable model of
any of Γ1 and Γ2.
4.6 Proof of Proposition 11
Lemma 1. Rule
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm → a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an (37)
(n > 0,m ≥ 0) where a1, . . . , an are atoms and l1, . . . , lm are literals, is strongly
equivalent to the set of n implications (i = 1, . . . , n)
(l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm ∧ (a1 → ai) ∧ · · · ∧ (an → ai))→ ai. (38)
Proof. Let F be (37) and Gi (i = 1, . . . , n) be (38). We want to prove that F is
strongly equivalent to {G1, . . . , Gn} by showing that FX is classically equivalent
to {GX1 , . . . , G
X
n }. Let H be l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm.
Case 1: X 6|= H . Then the antecedents of F and of all Gi are not satisfied
by X. It is then easy to verify that the reducts of F and of all Gi relative to X
are equivalent to ⊤. Case 2: X |= H and X 6|= F . Then clearly FX = ⊥. But,
for each i, GXi is ⊥: indeed, since X 6|= F , X 6|= ai for all i = 1, . . . , n. It
follows that the consequent of each Gi is not satisfied by X, but the antecedent is
satisfied, because X |= H and in each implication aj → ai in Gi, the antecedent
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is not satisfied. Case 3: X |= H and X |= F . This means that some of a1, . . . , an
belong to X. Assume, for instance, that a1, . . . , ap (0 < p ≤ n) belong to X,
and ap+1, . . . , an don’t. Then FX is equivalent to HX → (a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ap). Now
consider formula Gi. If i > p then the consequent ai is not satisfied by X, but also
the antecedent is not: it contains an implication a1 → ai; consequently GXi is ⊤.
On the other hand, if i ≤ p then the consequent ai is satisfied by X, as well as each
implication aj → ai in the antecedent of Gi. After a few simplifications, we can
rewrite GXi as
(HX ∧ (a1 → ai) ∧ · · · ∧ (ap → ai))→ ai.
It is not hard to see that this formula is classically equivalent to
(HX → (a1 ∨ . . . ,∨ap)
which is equivalent to FX , so that the claim easily follows.
Proposition 11. The problem of the existence of a stable model of a theory con-
sisting of formulas of the form F → a and F → ⊥ is ΣP2 -hard.
Proof. The problem is in class ΣP2 because, as mentioned in Section sec:prop-
compl, the same problem for the (larger) class of arbitrary theories is also in
ΣP2 [Pearce et al., 2001]. Hardness remains to be proven.
In view of Lemma 1, we can transform a disjunctive program into a theory
consisting of formulas of the form F ← a, with the same stable models and in
polynomial time. Consequently, as the existence of a stable model of a disjunctive
program is ΣP2 -hard by [Eiter and Gottlob, 1993], the same holds for theories as in
the statement of this proposition.
4.7 Proof of Propositions 12 and 13
For the proof of these propositions, we define an extended aggregate to be either
an aggregate of the form (6), or ⊥. It is easy to see, that, for each aggregate A of
the form (6) and any set X of atoms, AX is an extended aggregate. We also define,
for any extended aggregate A, Aˆ as
• the formula (9) if A has the form (6), and
• ⊥, otherwise.
Lemma 10. For any extended aggregate A, Aˆ is classically equivalent to A.
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Proof. The case A = ⊥ is trivial. The remaining case is when A is an aggregate.
Consider any possible conjunctive term HI (where I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}) of Aˆ:(∧
i∈I
Fi
)
→
(∨
i∈I
Fi
)
.
For each set X of atoms there is exactly one set I such that X 6|= HI : the set IX
that consists of the i’s such that X |= Fi. Consequently, for every set X of atoms,
X |= Aˆ iff HIX is not a conjunctive term of Aˆ
iff op({wi : i ∈ IX}) ≺ N
iff op({wi : X |= Fi}) ≺ N
iff X |= A.
Lemma 11. For any aggregate A and any set X of atoms, AˆX is classically equiv-
alent to AˆX .
Proof. Case 1: X 6|= A. Then AˆX = ⊥ˆ = ⊥. On the other hand, by Lemma 10,
X 6|= Aˆ so that AˆX = ⊥ also. Case 2: X |= A. Then A is an aggregate, and, by
the definition of a reduct, AˆX is∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
((∧
i∈I
FXi
)
→
(∨
i∈I
FXi
))
. (39)
On the other hand, AˆX is classically equivalent, by Lemma 2, to∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
((∧
i∈I
Fi
)
→
(∨
i∈I
Fi
))X
.
Notice that, since X |= Aˆ by Lemma 10, all implications in the formula above are
satisfied by X. Consequently, AˆX is classically equivalent to∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
((∧
i∈I
Fi
)X
→
(∨
i∈I
Fi
)X)
,
and then, by Lemma 2 again, to (39).
Proposition 12. Let A be an aggregate of the form (6) and let G be the corre-
sponding formula (9). Then
(a) G is classically equivalent to A, and
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(b) for any set X of atoms, GX is classically equivalent to AX .
Proof. Part (a) is immediate from Lemma 10, as G = Aˆ. For part (b), we need
to show that AˆX is classical equivalent to AX . By Lemma 11, AˆX is classically
equivalent to AˆX . It remains to notice that AˆX is classically equivalent to AX by
Lemma 10.
Lemma 12. For any aggregate op〈{F1 = w1, . . . , Fn = wn}〉 ≺ N , formula (9)
is classically equivalent to ∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(∨
i∈I
Fi
) (40)
if the aggregate is monotone, and to∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(
¬
∧
i∈I
Fi
)
if the aggregate is antimonotone.
Proof. Consider the case of a monotone aggregate first. Let G be (9), and H
be (40). It is easy to verify that H entails G. The opposite direction remains.
Assume G, and we want to derive every conjunctive term∨
i∈I
Fi (41)
in H . For every conjunctive term D of the form (41) in H , op({wi : i ∈ I}) 6≺ N .
As the aggregate is monotone then, for every subset I ′ of I , op({wi : i ∈ I ′}) 6≺
N , so that the implication
( ∧
i∈I′
Fi
)
→
( ∨
i∈I′
Fi
)
is a conjunctive term of H for all I ′ ⊆ I . Then, since I ′ = I ∪ (I \ I ′), (“⇒”
denotes entailment, and “⇔” equivalence)
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H ⇒
∧
I′⊆I
(( ∧
i∈I′
Fi
)
→
( ∨
i∈I′
Fi
))
⇔
∧
I′⊆I
((( ∧
i∈I′
Fi
)
∧
∧
i∈I′\I
¬Fi
)
→
(∨
i∈I
Fi
))
⇔
( ∨
I′⊆I
(( ∧
i∈I′
Fi
)
∧
∧
i∈I′\I
¬Fi
))
→ D.
The antecedent of the implication is a tautology: for each interpretation X, the
disjunctive term relative to I ′ = {i ∈ I : X |= Fi} is satisfied by X. We can
conclude that H entails D.
The proof for antimonotone aggregates is similar.
Proposition 13. For any aggregate op〈{F1 = w1, . . . , Fn = wn}〉 ≺ N , for-
mula (9) is strongly equivalent to ∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(∨
i∈I
Fi
)
if the aggregate is monotone, and to∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(
¬
∧
i∈I
Fi
)
if the aggregate is antimonotone.
Proof. Consider the case of a monotone aggregate first. Let G be (9), and H
be (40). In view of Proposition 5, it is sufficient to show that GX is equivalent to
HX in classical logic for all sets X. If X 6|= H then also X 6|= G by Lemma 12, so
that both reducts are ⊥. Otherwise (X |= H), by the same lemma, X |= G. Then,
by Lemma 11, GX is classically equivalent to (39). On the other hand, it is easy to
verify, by applying Lemma 2 to HX twice, that HX is classically equivalent to∧
I⊆{1,...,n} : op({wi : i∈I})6≺N
(∨
i∈I
FXi
)
.
The claim now follows from Lemma 12.
The reasoning for nonmonotone aggregates is similar.
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4.8 Proof of Proposition 14
Let Γ be the theory consisting of formulas (17)–(20).
Lemma 13. For any stable model X of Γ, X contains an atom si iff X contains
an atom bj such that bid j involves selling object i.
Proof. Consider Γ as a propositional theory. We notice that
• formulas (19) can be strongly equivalently grouped as m formulas (i =
1, . . . ,m) ( ∧
j=1,...,n: object i is part of bid j
bj
)
→ si,
and
• no other formula of Γ contains atoms of the form si outside the scope of
negation.
Consequently, by the Completion Lemma (Proposition 9), formulas (19) in Γ can
be replaced by m formulas (i = 1, . . . ,m)
( ∧
j=1,...,n: object i is part of bid j
bj
)
↔ si. (42)
preserving the stable models. It follows that every stable model of Γ must satisfy
formulas (42), and the claim immediately follows.
Proposition 14. X 7→ {i : bi ∈ X} is a 1–1 correspondence between the sta-
ble models of the theory consisting of formulas (17)–(20) and a solution to Joe’s
problem.
Proof. Take any stable model X of Γ. Since X satisfies rules (18) of Γ, condi-
tion (a) is satisfied. Condition (b) is satisfies as well, because X contains exactly
all atoms si sold in some bids by Lemma 13, and since X satisfies aggregate (20)
that belongs to Γ.
Now consider a solution of Joe’s problem. This determines which atoms of
the form bi belongs to a possible corresponding stable model X. Consequently,
Lemma 13 determines also which atoms of the form sj belong to X, reducing the
candidate stable models X to one. We need to show that this X is indeed a stable
model of Γ. The reduct ΓX consists of (after a few simplifications)
(i) all atoms bi that belong to X (from (17)),
(ii) ⊤ from (18) since (a) holds,
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(iii) (by Lemma 13) implications (19) such that both bj and si belong to X, and
(iv) the reduct of (20) relative to X.
Notice that (i)–(iii) together are equivalent to X, so that every every proper subset
of X doesn’t satisfy ΓX . It remains to show that X |= ΓX . Clearly, X satisfies (i)–
(iii). To show that X satisfies (iv) it is sufficient, by Lemma 5 (consider (20) as a
propositional formula), to show that X satisfies (20): it does that by hypothesis (b).
4.9 Proof of Propositions 15 and 16
Lemma 14. If, for every aggregate, computing op(W ) ≺ N requires polynomial
time then
(a) checking satisfaction of a theory with aggregates requires polynomial time,
and
(b) computing the reduct of a theory with aggregates requires polynomial time.
Proof. Part (a) is easy to verify by structural induction. Computing the reduct
essentially consists of checking satisfaction of subexpressions of each formula of
the theory. Each check doesn’t require too much time by (a). It remains to notice
that each formula with aggregates has a linear number of subformulas.
Proposition 15. If, for every aggregate, computing op(W ) ≺ N requires poly-
nomial time then the existence of a stable model of a theory with aggregates is a
ΣP2 -complete problem.
Proof. Hardness follows from the fact that theories with aggregates are a general-
ization of theories without aggregates. To prove inclusion, consider that the exis-
tence of a stable model of a theory Γ is equivalent to satisfiability of:
exists X such that for all Y , if Y ⊆ X then Y |= ΓX iff X = Y
It remains to notice that, in view of Lemma 14, checking (for any X and Y )
if Y ⊆ X then Y |= ΓX iff X = Y
requires polynomial time.
Lemma 15. Let F be a formula with aggregates containing monotone and anti-
monotone aggregates only, no equivalences and no implications other than nega-
tions. For any sets X, Y and Z such that Y ⊆ Z , if Y |= FX then Z |= FX .
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function verifyAS(Γ,X}
if X 6|= Γ then return false
∆ := {FX → a : F → a ∈ Γ and X |= a}
Y := ∅
while there is a formula G→ a ∈ ∆ such that Y |= G and a 6∈ Y
Y := Y ∪ {a}
end while
if Y = X then return true
return false
Figure 5: A polynomial-time algorithm that checks stable models of special kinds
of theories
Proof. Let G be F with each monotone aggregate replaced by (15) and each an-
timonotone aggregate replaced by (16). It is easy to verify that G is a nested ex-
pression. Nested expressions have all negative occurrences of atoms in the scope
of negation, so if Y |= GX then Z |= GX by Lemma (9). It remains to notice that
FX and GX are satisfied by the same sets of atoms by Propositions 13 and 12.
Proposition 16. Consider theories with aggregates consisting of formulas of the
form
F → a, (43)
where a is an atom or ⊥, and F contains monotone and antimonotone aggregates
only, no equivalences and no implications other than negations. If, for every ag-
gregate, computing op(W ) ≺ N requires polynomial time then the problem of the
existence of a stable model of theories of this kind is an NP-complete problem.
Proof. NP-hardness follows from the fact that theories with aggregates are a gen-
eralization of traditional programs, for which the same problem is NP-complete.
For inclusion in NP, it is sufficient to show that the time required to check if a set
X of atoms is a stable model of Γ is polynomial. An algorithm that does this test
is in Figure 5. It is easy to verify that it is a polynomial time algorithm. It remains
to prove that it is correct. If X 6|= Γ then it is trivial. Now assume that X |= Γ. It
is sufficient to show that
(a) ∆ is classically equivalent to ΓX , and
(b) the last value of Y (we call it Z) is the unique minimal model of ∆.
Indeed, for part (a), we notice that, since X |= Γ, ΓX is
{FX → aX : F → a ∈ Γ and X |= a}∪{FX → aX : F → a ∈ Γ and X 6|= a}.
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The first set is ∆. The second set (which includes the case in which a = ⊥) is a set
of ⊥ → ⊥. Indeed, each aX = ⊥, and since X |= Γ, X doesn’t satisfy any F and
then FX = ⊥.
For part (b) it is easy to verify that the while loop iterates as long as Y 6|= ∆,
so that Z |= ∆. Now assume, in sake of contradiction, that there is a set Z ′
that satisfies ∆ and that is not a superset of Z . Consider, in the execution of the
algorithm, the first atom a 6∈ Z ′ added to Y , and that value of Y ⊆ Z ′ to which
a has been added to. This means that ∆ contains a formula G → a such that
Y |= G. Recall that G stands for a formula of the form FX , where F is a formula
with aggregates with monotone and antimonotone aggregates only and without
implications (other than negations) or equivalences. Consequently, by Lemma 15,
Z ′ |= G. On the other hand, a 6∈ Z ′, so Z ′ 6|= G→ a, contradicting the hypothesis
that Z ′ is a model of ∆.
4.10 Proof of Proposition 17
Lemma 16. Let F and G two propositional formulas, and let F ′ and G′ the result
of replacing each occurrence of an atom a in F and G with a propositional formula
H . If F and G are strongly equivalent to each other then F ′ and G′ are strongly
equivalent to each other.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 5, in view of the following fact: if F and G are
equivalent in the logic of here-and-there to each other then F ′ and G′ are equivalent
in the logic of here-and-there to each other.
Lemma 17. Let F and G be two propositional formulas that are AND-OR com-
binations of ⊤, ⊥ and atoms only. If F and G are classically equivalent to each
other then they are strongly equivalent to each other also.
Proof. In view of Proposition 5, it is sufficient to show that, for every set X of
atoms, FX is classically equivalent to GX . By Lemma 2 we can distribute the
reduct operator in FX to its atoms. If follows that FX is classically equivalent
to F with all occurrences of atoms that don’t belong to X replaced by ⊥, and
similarly for GX . The fact that FX is classically equivalent to GX now follows
from the classical equivalence between F and G.
Next Lemma immediately follows from our definition of satisfaction of aggre-
gates (Section 3.1 of this paper), and the definition of [L ≤ S] and [S ≤ U ] and
Proposition 1 from [Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b].
Lemma 18. For every weight constraints L ≤ S and S ≤ U and any set X of
atoms,
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(a) X |= [L ≤ S] iff X |= sum〈S〉 ≥ L, and
(b) X |= [S ≤ U ] iff X |= sum〈S〉 ≤ U .
Proposition 17. In presence of nonnegative weights only, [N ≤ S] is strongly
equivalent to sum〈S〉 ≥ N , and [S ≤ N ] is strongly equivalent to sum〈S〉 ≤ N .
Proof. We start with (a), with the special case when rule elements F1, . . . , Fn of
S are distinct atoms. Since the aggregate is monotone then, by Lemma 13, we just
need to show that [N ≤ S] is strongly equivalent to (15). As classical equivalence
holds between [N ≤ S] and sum〈S〉 ≥ N by Lemma 18, the same relationship
holds between [N ≤ S] and (15). As both formulas are AND-OR combinations of
atoms, the claim follows by Lemma 17. The most general case of (a) follows from
the special case, by Lemma 16.
For part (b), we know, by Lemma 13, that antimonotone aggregate sum〈S〉 ≤
U (written as a formula (6)) is strongly equivalent to formula∧
I⊆{1,...,n} :
P
i∈I
wi>U
(
¬
∧
i∈I
Fi
)
.
By applying DeMorgan’s law to this last formula (which preserves equivalence in
the logic of here-and-there and then it is a strongly equivalent transformation by
Proposition 5) we get S ≤ U .
4.11 Proof of Proposition 18
Given a PDB-aggregate of the form (6) and a set X of literals, by IX we denote
the set {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : X |= Fi}.
Lemma 19. For each PDB-aggregate of the form (6), a set X of atoms satisfies a
formula of the form G(I1,I2) iff I1 ⊆ IX ⊆ I2.
Proof.
X |= G(I1,I2) iff X |= Fi for all i ∈ I1, and X 6|= Fi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ I2
iff X |= Fi for all i ∈ I1, and for every i such that X |= Fi, i ∈ I2
iff I1 ⊆ IX and IX ⊆ I2.
Lemma 20. For every PDB-aggregate A, Atr is classically equivalent to (9).
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Proof. Consider a set X of atoms. By Lemma 19, X |= Atr iff
X satisfies one of the disjunctive terms G(I1,I2) of Atr
and then iff
Atr contains a disjunctive term G(I1,I2) such that I1 ⊆ IX ⊆ I2.
It is easy to verify that if this condition holds then one of such terms G(I1,I2) is
G(IX ,IX). Consequently,
X |= Atr iff Atr contains disjunctive term G(IX ,IX)
iff op(WIX ) ≺ N.
We have essentially found that X |= Atr iff X |= A. The claim now follows by
Proposition 12(a).
Lemma 21. For any PDB-aggregate A, Atr is strongly equivalent to
(a) ∨
I∈{1,...,n}:op(WI)≺N
G(I,{1,...,n})
if A is monotone, and to
(b) ∨
I∈{1,...,n}:op(WI)≺N
G(∅,I)
if it is antimonotone.
Proof. To prove (a), assume that A is monotone. Then, if Atr contains a disjunctive
term G(I1,I2) then it contains the disjunctive term G(I1,{1,...,n}) as well. Consider
also that formula G(I1,{1,...,n}) entails G(I1,I2) in the logic of here-and-there. Then,
by Proposition 5, we can drop all disjunctive terms of the form G(I1,I2) with I2 6=
{1, . . . , n}, preserving strong equivalence. Formula Atr becomes∨
I1⊆{1,...,n}: for all I such that I1 ⊆ I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, op(WI) ≺ N
G(I1,{1,...,n}).
It remains to notice that, since A is monotone, if op(WI1) ≺ N then op(WI) ≺ N
for all I superset of I1.
The proof for (b) is similar.
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Proposition 18 For any monotone or antimonotone PDB-aggregates A of the form (6)
where F1, . . . , Fn are atoms, Atr is strongly equivalent to (9).
Proof. Let S be {F1 = w1, . . . , Fn = wn}. Lemma 20 says that Atr is classically
equivalent to (9) for every formulas F1, . . . , Fn in S. We can then prove the claim
of this proposition using Lemma 17, by showing that both Atr and (9) can be
strongly equivalently rewritten as AND-OR combinations of
• F1, . . . , Fn,⊤,⊥, if A is monotone, and
• ¬F1, . . . ,¬Fn,⊤,⊥, if A is antimonotone.
About (9), this has already been shown in the proof of Proposition 17, while, about
Atr , this is shown by Lemma 21. Indeed, each G(I,{1,...,n}) is a (possibly empty)
conjunction of terms of the form Fi, and each G(∅,I) is a (possibly empty) conjunc-
tion of terms of the form ¬Fi, since each Fi is an atom.
4.12 Proof of Proposition 19
We observe, first of all, that the definition of satisfaction of FLP-aggregates and
FLP-programs in [Faber et al., 2004] is equivalent to ours. The definition of a
reduct is different, however. Next lemma is easily provable by structural induc-
tion.
Lemma 22. For any nested expression F without negations and any two sets X
and Y of atoms such that Y ⊆ X, Y |= FX iff Y |= F.
Lemma 23. For any FLP-aggregate A and any set X of atoms, if X |= A then
Y |= AX iff Y |= A.
Proof. Let A have the form (6). Since X |= A, AX has the form
op〈{FX1 = w1, . . . , F
X
n = wn}〉 ≺ N.
In case of FLP-aggregates, each Fi is a conjunction of atoms. Then, by Lemma 22,
Y |= FXi iff Y |= Fi. The claim immediately follows from the definition of
satisfaction of aggregates.
Proposition 19. The stable models of a positive FLP-program under our semantics
are identical to its stable models in the sense of [Faber et al., 2004].
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Proof. It is easy to see that if X 6|= Π then X 6|= ΠX and X 6|= ΠX , so that X
is not a stable model under either semantics. Now assume that X |= Π. We will
show that the two reducts are satisfied by the same subsets of X. It is sufficient to
consider the case in which Π contains only one rule
A1 ∧ · · · ∧Am → a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an. (44)
If X 6|= A1 ∧ · · · ∧Am then ΠX = ∅, and ΠX is the tautology
⊥ → (a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an)
X .
Otherwise, ΠX is rule (44), and ΠX is
AX1 ∧ · · · ∧A
X
m → (a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an)
X .
These two reducts are satisfied by the same subsets of X by Lemmas 22 and 23.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a new definition of stable model — for proposition theories —
that is simple, very general, and that inherits several properties from logic programs
with nested expressions. On top of that, we have defined the concept of an aggre-
gate, both as an atomic operator and as a propositional formula. We hope that this
very general framework may be useful in the heterogeneous world of aggregates in
answer set programming.
Acknowledgements
We thank Vladimir Lifschitz for many useful comments on a draft of this paper.
References
[Baral and Uyan, 2001] Chitta Baral and Cenk Uyan. Declarative specification
and solution of combinatorial auctions using logic programming. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, 2173:186–199, 2001.
[Cabalar and Ferraris, 2007] Pedro Cabalar and Paolo Ferraris. Propositional the-
ories are strongly equivalent to logic programs. Theory Pract. Log. Program.,
7(6):745–759, 2007.
48
[Calimeri et al., 2005] Francesco Calimeri, Wolfgang Faber, Nicola Leone, and
Simona Perri. Declarative and computational properties of logic programs with
aggregates. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence (IJCAI), 2005.
[Denecker et al., 2001] Marc Denecker, Nikolay Pelov, and Maurice Bruynooghe.
Ultimate well-founded and stable semantics for logic programs with aggregates.
In Proc. ICLP, pages 212–226, 2001.
[Denecker et al., 2002] Marc Denecker, V. Wiktor Marek, and Mirosław
Truszczyn´ski. Ultimate approximations in nonmonotonic knowledge represen-
tation systems. In Proc. KR, pages 177–190, 2002.
[Dimopoulos et al., 1997] Yannis Dimopoulos, Bernhard Nebel, and Jana
Koehler. Encoding planning problems in non-monotonic logic programs. In
Sam Steel and Rachid Alami, editors, Proceedings of European Conference on
Planning, pages 169–181. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[Eiter and Gottlob, 1993] Thomas Eiter and Georg Gottlob. Complexity results
for disjunctive logic programming and application to nonmonotonic logics. In
Dale Miller, editor, Proceedings of International Logic Programming Sympo-
sium (ILPS), pages 266–278, 1993.
[Erdem et al., 2000] Esra Erdem, Vladimir Lifschitz, and Martin Wong. Wire
routing and satisfiability planning. In Proceedings of International Conference
on Computational Logic, pages 822–836, 2000.
[Erdem et al., 2003] Esra Erdem, Vladimir Lifschitz, Luay Nakhleh, and Donald
Ringe. Reconstructing the evolutionary history of Indo-European languages
using answer set programming. In Proceedings of International Symposium on
Practical Aspects of Declarative Languages (PADL), pages 160–176, 2003.
[Erdog˘an and Lifschitz, 2004] Selim T. Erdog˘an and Vladimir Lifschitz. Defini-
tions in answer set programming. In Vladimir Lifschitz and Ilkka Niemela¨,
editors, Proceedings of International Conference on Logic Programming and
Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR), pages 114–126, 2004.
[Faber et al., 2004] Wolfgang Faber, Nicola Leone, and Gerard Pfeifer.
Recursive aggregates in disjunctive logic programs: Semantics
and complexity. In Proceedings of European Conference on Log-
ics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA), 2004. Revised version:
http://www.wfaber.com/research/papers/jelia2004.pdf.
49
[Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005a] Paolo Ferraris and Vladimir Lifschitz. Mathemat-
ical foundations of answer set programming. In We Will Show Them! Essays in
Honour of Dov Gabbay, pages 615–664. King’s College Publications, 2005.
[Ferraris and Lifschitz, 2005b] Paolo Ferraris and Vladimir Lifschitz. Weight con-
straints as nested expressions. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming,
5:45–74, 2005.
[Ferraris, 2005] Paolo Ferraris. Answer sets for propositional theories. In Pro-
ceedings of International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmono-
tonic Reasoning (LPNMR), pages 119–131, 2005.
[Ferraris, 2007] Paolo Ferraris. Expressiveness of answer set languages. PhD
thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 2007. PhD thesis.
[Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] Michael Gelfond and Vladimir Lifschitz. The sta-
ble model semantics for logic programming. In Robert Kowalski and Kenneth
Bowen, editors, Proceedings of International Logic Programming Conference
and Symposium, pages 1070–1080. MIT Press, 1988.
[Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] Michael Gelfond and Vladimir Lifschitz. Classical
negation in logic programs and disjunctive databases. New Generation Comput-
ing, 9:365–385, 1991.
[Heljanko and Niemela¨, 2001] Keijo Heljanko and Ilkka Niemela¨. Answer set
programming and bounded model checking. In Working Notes of the AAAI
Spring Symposium on Answer Set Programming, 2001.
[Hietalahti et al., 2000] Maarit Hietalahti, Fabio Massacci, and Nielela¨ Ilkka. a
challenge problem for nonmonotonic reasoning systems. In Proceedings of the
8th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, 2000.
[Koksal et al., 2001] Pinar Koksal, Kesim Cicekli, and I. Hakki Toroslu. Specifi-
cation of wrokflow processes using the action description language ⌋. In Work-
ing Notes of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Answer Set Programming, 2001.
[Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] Vladimir Lifschitz and Hudson Turner. Splitting a
logic program. In Pascal Van Hentenryck, editor, Proceedings of International
Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP), pages 23–37, 1994.
[Lifschitz et al., 1999] Vladimir Lifschitz, Lappoon R. Tang, and Hudson Turner.
Nested expressions in logic programs. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence, 25:369–389, 1999.
50
[Lifschitz et al., 2001] Vladimir Lifschitz, David Pearce, and Agustin Valverde.
Strongly equivalent logic programs. ACM Transactions on Computational
Logic, 2:526–541, 2001.
[Lifschitz, 1996] Vladimir Lifschitz. Foundations of logic programming. In Ger-
hard Brewka, editor, Principles of Knowledge Representation, pages 69–128.
CSLI Publications, 1996.
[Lifschitz, 1999] Vladimir Lifschitz. Answer set planning. In Proc. ICLP-99,
pages 23–37, 1999.
[Liu et al., 1998] Xinxin. Liu, C. R. Ramakrishnan, and Scott A. Smolka. Fully
local and efficient evaluation of alternating fixed points. In Proc. Fourth Int’l
Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Sys-
tems, pages 5–19, 1998.
[Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1991] Victor Marek and Mirosław Truszczyn´ski. Au-
toepistemic logic. Journal of ACM, 38:588–619, 1991.
[Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1999] Victor Marek and Mirosław Truszczyn´ski. Sta-
ble models and an alternative logic programming paradigm. In The Logic Pro-
gramming Paradigm: a 25-Year Perspective, pages 375–398. Springer Verlag,
1999.
[Niemela¨ and Simons, 2000] Ilkka Niemela¨ and Patrik Simons. Extending the
Smodels system with cardinality and weight constraints. In Jack Minker, ed-
itor, Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence, pages 491–521. Kluwer, 2000.
[Niemela¨, 1999] Ilkka Niemela¨. Logic programs with stable model semantics as a
constraint programming paradigm. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intel-
ligence, 25:241–273, 1999.
[Osorio et al., 2004] Mauricio Osorio, Juan Antonio Navarro, and Jose´ Arrazola.
Safe beliefs for propositional theories. Accepted to appear at Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic, 2004.
[Pearce et al., 2001] David Pearce, Hans Tompits, and Stefan Woltran. Encodings
for equilibrium logic and logic programs with nested expressions. In Proceed-
ings of Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence (EPIA), pages 306–320,
2001.
[Pearce, 1997] David Pearce. A new logical characterization of stable models and
answer sets. In Ju¨rgen Dix, Luis Pereira, and Teodor Przymusinski, editors,
51
Non-Monotonic Extensions of Logic Programming (Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence 1216), pages 57–70. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[Pearce, 1999] David Pearce. From here to there: Stable negation in logic pro-
gramming. In D. Gabbay and H. Wansing, editors, What Is Negation? Kluwer,
1999.
[Pelov et al., 2003] Nikolay Pelov, Marc Denecker, and Maurice Bruynooghe.
Translation of aggregate programs to normal logic programs. In Proc. Answer
Set Programming, 2003.
[Soininen and Niemela¨, 1998] Timo Soininen and Ilkka Niemela¨. Developing a
declarative rule language for applications in product configuration. In Gopal
Gupta, editor, Proceedings of International Symposium on Practical Aspects of
Declarative Languages (PADL), pages 305–319. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
[Son and Lobo, 2001] Tran Cao Son and Jorge Lobo. Reasoning about policies
using logic programs. In Working Notes of the AAAI Spring Symposium on
Answer Set Programming, 2001.
[Son et al., 2007] Tran Cao Son, Enrico Pontelli, and Phan Huy Tu. Answer sets
for logic programs with arbitrary abstract constraint atoms. J. Artif. Intell. Res.
(JAIR), 29:353–389, 2007.
[Trajcevski et al., 2000] Goce Trajcevski, Chitta Baral, and Jorge Lobo. Formal-
izing (and reasoning about) the specifications of workflows. In Proceedings of
the Fifth IFCIS International conference on Cooperative Information Systems
(CoopIS’2000), 2000.
[Turner, 2003] Hudson Turner. Strong equivalence made easy: nested expres-
sions and weight constraints. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming,
3(4,5):609–622, 2003.
52
